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CURRENT ISSUES
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD AT A
LEGAL CROSSROAD: AN ANALYSIS
OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION IN
NEW YORK
Balancing social concerns against the reproductive rights of in-
dividuals is the heart of the controversy that has raged in recent
years over the reproductive method known as surrogate mother-
hood.' This method is far from revolutionary' but its increased
frequency8 as an alternative reproduction technique has sparked
' See generally C. GROBSTEIN, FROM CHANCE TO PURPOSE AN APPRAISAL OF EXTERNAL
HUMAN FERTILIZATION (1981) (discussing in vitro fertilization and the embryo transfer pro-
cedure). The surrogate method involves the artificial insemination of a woman with a do-
nor's sperm. See Wadlington, Artificial Conception: The Challenge for Family Law, 69 VA. L.
REV. 465, 475-76 (1983). In most cases, the donor is the husband of a woman who is bio-
logically unable to have children. Surrogate mothering differs from more traditional artifi-
cial insemination methods such as in vitro fertilization or embryo transfer in two significant
ways. Id. First, the wife of the donor is in no way genetically related to the child and does
not participate in the gestation process. Id. Second, the surrogate signs a contract which
requires that she relinquish all rights to the child and finally, she is paid for her services.
Id. See generally N. KEANE & D. BREO, THE SURROGATE MOTHER (1981) (case studies of the
legal and emotional complexities surrounding surrogate motherhood).
' See Goldfarb, Two Mothers, One Baby, No Law, 11 HuM. RTs. 26 (Summer 1983). The
notion of surrogate motherhood can be traced back to biblical times. See Genesis 16:1-6.
Approximately four thousand years ago Abraham's wife, Sarah, who was unable to con-
ceive, directed her husband to the maid Hagar, who bore Ishmael. Id. This passage pro-
vides, "Behold now, the Lord prevented me from bearing children. Go into my maid; it
may that I shall obtain children by her. And Abraham harkened to the voice of Sarah."Id.
The Hagar Institute, a surrogate mother service in Topeka, Kansas, derives its name from
this biblical event. See generally Robertson, Surrogate Mothers: Not So Novel After All, THE
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1983 (historical survey of utilization of the surrogate method).
" See NEW YORK STATE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE SURROGATE PARENTING; A PROPOSAL
FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM at 17 (1987) [hereinafter SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT]. Recent es-
timates indicate that one out of every eight American couples failed to conceive after one
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heated debate. Serious questions have been raised in the legal,4
medical6  and religious' communities. Opponents of surrogate
motherhood cite public policy concerns and claim that it is a dis-
guised form of baby selling.' Proponents on the other hand, con-
year of attempts. Id. at 9. In the past twenty years the occurrence of infertility has nearly
tripled. Wallis, The Saddest Epidemic, TIME, Sept. 10, 1984, at 50. See also Bird, Surrogate
Motherhood hers? yours? ours?, CAL. LAW., Feb. 1982, 21, 21-22.
Other explanations for the increased use of the surrogate method can be traced to
changing social norms. See Bodenheimer, New Trends in Requirements in Adoption Law and
Proposals for Legislative Change, 49 S. CALIF. L. REV. 10, 13 (1975). Permissive abortion laws
and greater reliance on birth control methods have led to a dramatic decrease in the num-
ber of babies born and available for adoption. Id. In addition, the social stigma of being an
unwed mother has waned to such an extent that more women are deciding to keep their
babies. See also Aral & Cates, The Increasing Concern with Infertility, 250 J. A.M.A. 2327, 2327
(1986). Furthermore, many more women are choosing to delay childbearing for educa-
tional, financial and career-oriented reasons and consequently, may not discover that they
are unable to bear children until they are in their thirties. See Note, Legal Recognition of
Surrogate Gestation, 7 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 107, 107-08 n.2. (1980) (Couples wishing to
adopt are deterred by the lengthy and slow adoption process which does not guarantee
results); Adoption and Foster Care 1975: Hearings on Baby Selling Before the Subcomm. on Chil-
dren & Youth of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1975)
(estimated wait to adopt is three to seven years).
See generally Note, Surrogate Mothers: The Legal Issues, 7 AM. J. L. & MED. 323 (1981)
(elaboration of legal issues surrounding surrogate parenting).
' See Postell, Establishing Guidelines for Artificial Conception, TRIAL, Nov. 1986, at 93. The
Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society recently released guidelines addressing
ethical, moral and legal issues focusing upon artificial birth technologies. ETHICAL CONSID-
ERATIONS OF NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, (Supp. 1) Sept. 1986, at 675. This report
provides: "The Committee does not recommend widespread clinical application of surro-
gate motherhood at this time . . . The Committee has serious ethical reservations about
surrogacy which cannot be fully resolved until appropriate data are available for assessment
of the risks and possible benefits of this alternative." id.
' See Note, Therapeutic Impregnation: Prognosis of a Lawyer - Diagnosis of a Legislature, 39 U.
CIN. L. REV. 291, 300-02 (1970). As early as 1949, the Catholic Church condemned artifi-
cial insemination in all forms as prohibited by and contrary to morality and the law of
nature. Id. In a discourse to the fourth international convention of Catholic doctors held in
Rome in September, 1949, Pope Pius XII concluded that:
[artificial insemination] outside of marriage is to be condemned purely and simply as
immoral. According to both the natural law and the divine positive law, the procrea-
tion of new life can be only the fruit of marriage . . . The child conceived under
these conditions would be, by that very fact illegitimate ....
Id. at 301. The Catholic Church recently maintained this position in a Vatican report de-
claring "moral opposition to virtually all forms of artificial fertilization and embryo trans-
fer, and approving medical interference in human procreation only when it assists a mar-
ried couple who have engaged in a 'normal' sexual act." Suro, Vatican Asks Governments to
Curb Birth Technology and to Outlaw Surrogates, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1987, at A I, col. 6.
' See infra notes 19-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of the black market sale of
children. But see N. KEANE & D. BREO, supra note 1, at 154 (remarking that public policy
underlying the antipathy to payment for adoption is largely inapplicable to surrogate
situations).
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tend that the surrogate contract 8 is a valid agreement stemming
from a constitutional right to reproduce' thereby warranting spe-
cial protection.
It is submitted that the application of existing legislation to sur-
rogate parenting arrangements has proven to be both inappropri-
ate and ineffective to adequately protect the rights of the child,
the biological father and the surrogate mother. Moreover, in the
absence of definitive legislation, the controversy will inevitably
continue.
This Article discusses applicable contract, constitutional and
family law issues. In addition, bills put before the New York legis-
lature concerning surrogate arrangements0 will be evaluated. It is
submitted that new legislation which is both responsive to the
needs of infertile couples yet sufficiently tailored to safeguard
against abuse is not only feasible but desirable as well.
I. CONTRACTUAL ANALYSIS
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the surrogate procedure
as opposed to other reproductive techniques is the surrogate con-
tract.1 Essentially, it is an agreement between a married couple
who is biologically incapable of having a child 2 and a fertile wo-
man 1  who agrees to be artificially inseminated with the donor's
* See infra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.
' See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
"o See infra notes 84-124 and accompanying text for a discussion and comparison of the
two proposals.
" See N. KEANE & D. BREO, supra note 1, at 268-305 (example of preliminary forms and
basic surrogate agreement).
" Id. at 268. Some couples seek a surrogate not because of infertility but because of the
fear that genetic problems of the mother will be passed on to the child and/or create a life
threatening situation for the mother as a result of the pregnancy. Id. Such was the case in
In re Baby "M", 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987) where
Mrs. Stern, the biological father's wife, was advised against having children because of her
affliction with" multiple sclerosis. Id. at 336, 525 A.2d at 1139.
18 Parker, Motivation of Surrogate Mothers: Initial Findings, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 117,
188 (1983). A recent study concluded that the motivating factors of women who wish to
become surrogate mothers are complex. Id. Approximately 85% of the women indicated
that while money was not their sole motivation, they would not participate without com-
pensation. Id. Other factors included enjoyment of being pregnant, the desire to give the
gift of a baby to an infertile couple, and an emotional need to compensate for the loss of a
child due to abortion or adoption. Id. See also Kantrowitz, Who Keeps 'Baby M'?, NEWSWEEK,
Jan. 19, 1987, at 46, 46-47.
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sperm, to carry the child to term, and upon the birth of the child,
to surrender all parental rights.1' The contracting parties pay the
surrogate mother a fee 15 in addition to necessarily incurred medi-
cal costs. Very often, the couple also pays a fee to a third party
intermediary who is responsible for making the arrangements.1
" See supra note I and accompanying text. The contract between the parties in the Baby
"M" case was typical. Paragraph 3 of the contract provided:
3. WILLIAM STERN, Natural Father, does hereby enter into this written contrac-
tual Agreement with MARY BETH WHITEHEAD Surrogate, where MARY BETH
WHITEHEAD shall be artificially inseminated with the semen of WILLIAM
STERN by a physician. MARY BETH WHITEHEAD, Surrogate, upon becoming
pregnant, acknowledges that she will carry said embryo/fetus(s) until delivery.
MARY BETH WHITEHEAD, Surrogate, and RICHARD WHITEHEAD, her hus-
band, agree that they will cooperate with any background investigation into the Sur-
rogate's medical, family and personal history and warrants the information to be
accurate to the best of their knowledge. MARY BETH WHITEHEAD, Surrogate,
and RICHARD WHITEHEAD, her husband, agree to surrender custody of the
child to WILLIAM STERN, Natural Father, immediately upon birth, acknowledg-
ing that it is the intent of this Agreement in the best interests of the child to do so;
as well as institute and cooperate in proceedings to terminate their respective paren-
tal rights to said child, and sign any and all necessary affidavits, documents, and the
like, in order to further the intent and purposes of this Agreement. It is understood
by MARY BETH WHITEHEAD, and RICHARD WHITEHEAD, that the child to
be conceived is being done so for the sole purpose of giving said child to WILLIAM
STERN, its natural'and biological father. MARY BETH WHITEHEAD and RICH-
ARD WHITEHEAD agree to sign all necessary affidavits prior to and after the birth
of the child and voluntarily participate in any paternity proceedings necessary to
have WILLIAM STERN'S name entered on said child's birth certificate as the natu-
ral or biological father.
Contract dated February 6, 1985, by and between William Stern, Mary Beth Whitehead
and Richard Whitehead. Copy on file in Journal of Legal Commentary office at St. John's
University School of Law, Jamaica, New York [hereinafter Stern contract]. See also Sha-
piro, No Other Hope for Having a Child, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 19, 1987, at 50.
" See Goldfarb, supra note 2, at 28. The payment to the surrogate is viewed as compen-
sation for undertaking the risks of pregnancy, pain and suffering, risk of death, loss of
wages and loss of consortium. Id. See also N. KEANE & D. BRo, supra note 1, at 269 (fees
for the surrogate's services are approximately $10,000). But see infra note 20; Keane, Legal
Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 1980 S. ILL U.L.J. 147, 153 & n.48 (citing letter to Mar-
garet Pfeiffer from Wayne County, Michigan Juvenile Court Executive Judge James Lin-
coln where he expressed opinion "that only the direct medical expenses of the surrogate
mother-not the value of her services in carrying the child" or her foregone income-
could be approved by the court).
1" See SENATE COMMiTTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 17. The use of infertility centers as a
means of matching infertile couples with surrogates has become increasingly popular. Id.
Major centers are currently operating in New York, Detroit, Philadelphia, Louisville, Co-
lumbus and Topeka. Id. at 19 n.20. The following fee structure is common: $6,500 to
$10,000 for the infertility center, $10,000 for the surrogate mother plus all medical ex-
penses not covered by the surrogate's health insurance, $300 for psychiatric evaluation of
the surrogate, term life insurance for the surrogate, $400 for an attorney for the surro-




As a final step, the biological father establishes paternity 7 and his
wife legally adopts the child.'
While the arrangement initially appears equitable to all parties,
opponents of the surrogate method have challenged it as being a
disguised form of baby selling.' Public policy arguments have
" See supra, note 14 and accompanying text (contract between Sterns and Whiteheads
specifically stated that parties agreed to participate in necessary paternity proceedings). Op-
ponents of the surrogate arrangement have sought to preclude the biological father from
obtaining an order of filiation, even where the surrogate joins in his request. Syrkowski v.
Appleyard, 420 Mich. 367, 362 N.W.2d 211 (1985). In Syrkowski, the natural father sought
to have his name entered upon the birth certificate. Id. at 370, 362 N.W.2d at 212. The
Attorney General of Michigan intervened, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction
to grant the relief requested because it was beyond the scope and purpose of the Paternity
Act. Id. at 370, 362 N.W.2d at 212. The trial court granted the Attorney General's motion
for accelerated judgment and the appellate court affirmed. Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 122
Mich. App. 506, 333 N.W.2d 90 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983), rev'd, 420 Mich. 367, 362 N.W.2d
211 (1985). The Michigan Supreme Court reversed that decision however, finding that
there was subject matter jurisdiction over the natural father's request even in the context
of a surrogate arrangement. Syrkowski, 420 Mich. at 375, 362 N.W.2d at 214.
" See Note, Surrogate Motherhood and the Baby-Selling Laws, 20 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS.
1, 8 (1986). In the situation where the natural father's wife is a party to the surrogate
contract, it is often necessary to take the child out of the state for adoption since 24 states
prohibit the payment of any consideration, other than medical expenses, in connection
with adoptions. Id. For example, New York requires that an affidavit be filed stating that
no compensation, other than medical and legal fees, have been paid in connection with the
adoption. N.Y. DoM. REL LAW § 116(3)(d) (McKinney 1977); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 374(6)
(McKinney 1983); cf. Florida Step-Parent Adoption Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.04(2)(d)
(West 1985) (does not include a residency requirement or disclosure of any fee paid). Re-
cently, however, infertility centers have drafted surrogate contracts requiring only the nat-
ural father's signature. See Brophy, A Surrogate Mother Contract to Bear a Child, 20 J. FAM. L.
263, 264 (1981-82). In this way, the natural father's wife is not a party to the contract. Id.
at 264. Moreover, she is not actually involved with any payments made to the surrogate,
which enables her to petition to adopt in her home state without concern that she will have
violated any state prohibition of compensation in connection with adoption. Id.
1, See Op. Ky. Att'y. Gen. No. 81-18, reprinted in 7 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 2246, 2247
(1981) (surrogate contracts declared illegal and void as contrary to Kentucky's strong pub-
lic policy against buying and selling children); Op. Ohio Att'y. Gen. No. 83-001 Uan. 3,
1983) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio AG file) (surrogate activities appear to be a violation of
statute prohibiting any person or organization from "hold[ing] out inducements to parents
to part with their offspring, or in any manner knowingly becomling] a party to the separa-
tion of a child from its parents . . . except through a juvenile court commitment."); See
also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5103.17 (Baldwin 1987). Op. Kan. Att'y. Gen. No. 82-150 (July
2, 1982) (LEXIS, States library, Kan. AG file) ("The sovereign has an interest in a minor
child superior to that of the parent; hence, there is a public policy against the custody of a
child becoming the subject of barter."); 15 S. WLu.LsroN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CON-
TRAcMs § 1744A (3d ed. 1972). But see Kentucky v. Bershear, 10 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 1105
(1983) (surrogate contract upheld; court notes conceptual problem in characterizing the
natural father as buying his own baby); Surrogate Parenting Assocs. v. Kentucky, 704
S.W.2d 209, 211 (Ky. 1986) (infertility center's involvement in surrogate parenting proce-
dure not to be construed as participation in the buying and selling of babies). Further,
child custody contracts are voidable not void. Id. at 213.
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been promulgated on the premise that a child is not chattel and
may not be bought or sold.20 An analogy is drawn to the black-
market sale of babies"1 which is prohibited by existing adoption
statutes in each of the fifty states. 2" This view has found rather
limited acceptance in the courts. In Doe v. Kelley,'3 the Michigan
Court of Appeals held that the constitutional right to bear or be-
get a child' 4 did not bestow upon the surrogate mother the right
to bear a child in exchange for compensation, while utilizing the
adoption laws to effect the transfer of the child to the contracting
couple.'5 While the court's interpretation is clearly in furtherance
of policy concerns, it is suggested that the crucial issue is not the
legality of the procedure itself but rather the legality of permit-
ting remuneration to the surrogate as consideration for services
rendered. The Kelley court found that the interest of the state in
preventing the black-marketing of infants was sufficiently compel-
ling to justify denying compensation to the mother.' 6 Implicit in
that decision, however, is the notion that absent compensation,
Michigan no longer has a viable interest in prohibiting such agree-
ments since the characteristics of black-marketing no longer
exist.' 7
One feature distinguishing the surrogate contract from the
10 See SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 32-36. Critics of surrogate arrange-
ments fear that acceptance of the practice could lead to commercialization and dehumani-
zation of reproduction. Id. Extended to logical extremes, surrogate arrangements could
lead to development of breeder farms and the mass marketing of babies. Id.
" See generally Comment, Moppets on the Market: The Problem of Unregulated Adoptions, 59
YALE LJ. 715 (1950) (discussion of the need for closer state supervision over adoption
process).
" See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
13 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1183 (1983).
" See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (discussion of the constitutional right
to privacy). See also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (right of privacy
extends to a minor's decision concerning contraception); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (unmarried persons have right to make own choices concerning birth control); Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (state may not interfere with intimate marital
relations).
", 106 Mich. App. at 173-74, 307 N.W.2d at 441.
" Id.
" Cf Op. Ohio Att'y. Gen. No. 83-868 (Oct. 18, 1983) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio AG
file) (surrogate contracts considered not to be in violation of Louisiana statutes prohibiting
the sale of minor children where adopting parents pay only actual prenatal care and living
expenses of the surrogate mother, in addition to her necessary actual living and medical
expenses for a period up to thirty days after birth).
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.sale" of babies is that the former is an agreement to "bear" a
child not to "sell" a child.2 While this may seem to be a fine de-
marcation, the distinction is further supported by the fact that the
surrogate contract is a consensual arrangement made prior to con-
ception.2 In light of these factors, it is difficult to characterize the
surrogate contract as black-marketing. In Surrogate Parenting As-
socs. v. Kentucky30 it was precisely the absence of the coercive na-
ture of black-marketing that the court found "central"'" to a deci-
sion to uphold the defendant infertility center's charter, thereby
permitting it to assist in matching infertile couples with potential
surrogate mothers.
Assuming the validity of the surrogate contract, other serious
public policy ramifications impinge upon the postnatal surrender
of the child. Despite an unequivocal promise to relinquish all pa-
rental rights to the child, the possibility always exists that the sur-
rogate will renege on her promise or simply change her mind. 2
Such was the situation in the case In re Baby "M","5 where the
surrogate mother refused to comply with the essential terms of
the surrogate agreement.8 ' The infertile couple took refuge in a
is See Comment, Contracts to Bear a Child, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 611, 613 (1978).
" See N. KEANE & D. BREO, supra note 1, at 154 (surrogate contracts differ because they
are the product of the contracting couple's desire to bring a child into existence by consen-
sual prearrangement which is, as far as biologically possible, their "own"); Comment, Sur-
rogate Mother Agreements: Contemporary Legal Aspects of a Biblical Notion, 16 U. RIcH L. REV.
467, 478-79 (1982) (surrogate agreements do not fit into the black market profile because
they involve uncoerced, independent decisions to enter into an agreement to bear a child
prior to conception).
3 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986).
3, Id. at 211. The court stated:
But the central fact in the surrogate parenting procedure is that the agreement to
bear a child is entered into before conception. The essential consideration for the
surrogate when she agrees to the surrogate parenting procedure is not avoiding the
consequences of an unwanted pregnancy or the fear of the financial burden of child-
rearing. On the contrary, the essential consideration is to assist a person or couple
who desperately want a child but are unable to conceive one in the customary man-
ner to achieve a biologically related offspring.
Id. at 211-12 (emphasis added).
"' See, e.g., Noyes v. Thrane, No. CF 7614, slip op. (La. 1981) (surrogate changed her
mind after discovering that natural father's wife had undergone a sex-change operation
but paternity suit dropped to avoid publicity adverse to child's welfare); In re Steve B.D. &
Linda Sue D., No. 15998, slip op. (Idaho June 17, 1986) (surrogate changed her mind
three weeks after termination of her parental rights but lost custody after court ruled that
child's best interests should take precedence over presumption in favor of natural mother).
217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987).
4Id.
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New Jersey court seeking enforcement of the contract in addition
to the equitable relief of specific performance.85 The court
awarded custody to the contracting couple, William and Elizabeth
Stern, basing its decision on the best interests of the child. 6
Breach by the surrogate mother" presents a very difficult prob-
lem in the determination of an appropriate remedy. 8 Traditional
contract law has been an inappropriate means of settling disputes
especially where the nature of the contract is so personal.3 9 Courts
"historically have refused to order an individual to perform a con-
tract for personal services . . . [f]or practical policy and constitu-
tional reasons; "40 yet, it is obvious that under the circumstances of
31 See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 358 (1932). Assuming the validity of surrogate con-
tracts, the non-breaching party would obviously seek the equitable remedy of specific per-
formance. Id. Such an order would require that the surrogate perform precisely as she
promised. Id. See also J. CALAMARI & J. PsILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 581 (1977).
" 217 N.J. Super. at 323, 525 A.2d at 1132. The court stated "[tihe primary issue to be
determined by this litigation is what are the best interests of a child until now called 'Baby
M'. All other concerns raised by counsel constitute commentary." Id. Since custody was
awarded to the Sterns based on the best interests of Baby M, now Melissa Stern, it is sub-
mitted that the discussions regarding the contract determined only that Mrs. Whitehead
was entitled to the original contract fee of $10,000 because the court "specifically en-
forced" the agreement. Id. The court failed to make any further legal findings concerning
the validity of the surrogate contract in the absence of a legislative directive. Id.
' See generally Note, Surrogate Parenthood - An Analysis of the Problems and a Solution:
Representation for the Child, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 143, 166 (1985) (refusal to relinquish
custody of child is not the only possible breach). For example, the surrogate could partially
breach by failing to receive proper prenatal care, thereby jeopardizing the health of the
fetus, or by failing to properly care for herself in accordance with the terms of the con-
tract. Id. See also Black, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 16 NEW ENG. L. REV. 373,
393-94 (1981) (contract guards against the surrogate's practicing of contraception or en-
gaging in activities detrimental to health of fetus); Coleman, Surrogate Motherhood: Analysis
of the Problems and Suggestions for Solutions, 50 TENN. L. REV. 71, 86 (1982) (terms of the
surrogate contract generally include prohibition of smoking, drinking and a required pe-
riod of abstinence from intercourse until conception is proven).
" See Keane, supra note 15, at 167-68. See generally Comment, Surrogate Mother Agree-
ments: Contemporary Legal Aspects of a Biblical Notion, 16 U. RICH. L. REv. 467, 469-71 (1982)
(discussion of basic contract remedies applied to surrogate agreements); Note, Surrogate
Motherhood: Contractual Issues and Remedies Under Legislative Proposals, 23 WASHBURN L.J.
601, 609-17 (1984) (legislative proposals urged to minimize likelihood of breach of surro-
gate contract).
" See Comment, supra note 38, at 470. In surrogate contracts, as with any personal ser-
vices contract, the courts will generally not grant specific performance. Id. Policy consider-
ations such as the difficulty of court supervision of such contracts, the possibility of a viola-
tion of the thirteenth amendment prohibition against involuntary servitude and a
reluctance to force individuals into unwanted personal associations, underly the court's re-
fusal to grant specific performance. Id. See also Keane, supra note 15, at 167-68 (discussing
how the enforcement problem in the surrogate situation would be "monumental").
40 Keane, supra note 15, at 167-68. Other policy concerns peculiar to the surrogate
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the surrogate arrangement, the infertile couple will hardly be sat-
isfied with money damages."'
Where the breach is occasioned by the fault of the infertile
couple," the solutions appear to be more clear cut. If the breach
occurs prior to conception, the surrogate is entitled to bring suit
for the amount due her under the contract, as well as any medical
expenses incurred up to the time of breach."" Traditional contract
remedies adequately accomodate this scenario as there is no child
to consider. However, if the breach occurs after conception, the
remedies are not so simple." The surrogate could presumably
abort the pregnancy if she has not reached her third trimester 5
mother situation involve a reluctance to effect the transfer of a child from its natural
mother to the intended parents. See SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 30-31. But
see KEANE, supra note 15, at 168 (specific performance feasible where surrogate breaches
after birth because once child is born, it is within the power of the courts to order the
surrogate to consent and deliver child into custody of biological parent); Note, Rumpeistil-
skin Revisited: The Inalienable Rights of Surrogate Mothers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1955
(1986) (courts should permit specific performance because the risks are so severe in com-
parison with an inalienable abortion right and denying specific performance would risk
comparable harm to the father). In the case of Baby "M", specific performance was granted
to the contracting couple on the basis that doing so would be in the child's-best interests.
Baby "M", 217 N.J. Super. at 390, 525 A.2d at 1167. This determination was made in light
of the absence of any rule of law which would squarely resolve the issue. Id.
"' See Note, supra note 40, at 1953-54. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to assess
monetary damages for the mental anquish of the natural father and his wife once their
hopes for having their own child are destroyed by the surrogate's breach of the agreement
to surrender the child after its birth. Id.
4' See Note, supra note 37, at 165 n.143. There are numerous ways in which the em-
ployer can breach: by failing to pay the agreed compensation, by refusing to submit to the
artificial insemination procedure, or by refusing to accept custody because the child is of
the wrong sex or is handicapped. Id.
In one recent case, in contrast to the Baby "M" situation where four people were battling
over custody, none of the contracting parties came foward to claim the baby born to surro-
gate Judy Stiver because it was born with birth defects indicating mental retardation.
Malahoff v. Stiver, No. 83-655, slip op. (E.D. Mich. 1983). Although a paternity test re-
vealed that Mrs. Stiver's husband was the natural father, the parties continued their suits
against one another for breach of contract. Id. See infra notes 43-46 and accompanying
text.
e3 See Keane, supra note 15, at 167 (breach by contracting couple presents no new con-
tractual problems); Note, The Surrogate Mother Contract in Indiana, 15 IND. L. REV. 807, 820
(1982) (measure of damages might be contract price less expected expenses if included). See
generally J. CALAMARI & J. PaiLLlo, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 14-4 (2d ed. 1977) (list of
contract remedies).
" See infra notes 52-66 and accompanying text. Issues arising from a breach after birth
involve the child's paternity and status as a legitimate or an illegitimate child. Id.
4 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-64 (1973). The Roe Court held that a woman has
a fundamental right to choose whether to have an abortion until she reaches the third
trimester of pregnancy. Id. After that point, the state's interest in protecting a viable fetus
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and thereafter sue for damages. If the child is already born or the
surrogate is in her third trimester, the child could be placed for
adoption and the surrogate could then sue for damages."
Whatever the situation, a discussion of traditional contract prin-
ciples in the context of the surrogate contract, where an innocent
life is the basis of the agreement, seems incongruous. It is submit-
ted, therefore, that the implications of surrogate contracts and
remedies for breach thereof should be evaluated with a focus on
both contract principles and public policy concerns as a whole,
rather than considering the two concepts as mutually exclusive. In
this way, the desires of infertile couples and the concerns of soci-
ety are most satisfactorily addressed.
II. FAMILY LAW IMPLICATIONS
While the courts have encountered much difficulty in recon-
ciling the surrogate arrangement with traditional contract law, the
application of family law principles has proved equally cumber-
some. Currently, the laws of most states are not equipped to ad-
dress the surrogate parenting arrangement. 7 The cases in this
area are limited and are characterized by a reluctance on the part
of the court to take a definitive stance on the issue"" without legis-
is sufficiently compelling to warrant the regulation or even proscription of abortions. Id.
" See Note, supra note 40, at 1953-54. While the court would have great difficulty in
assessing the damages due to the contracting natural father, it would be equally difficult
where the natural father, himself, was the breaching party. Id. The court would be re-
quired to place a monetary value on the services of and the inconvenience to the surrogate
who is carrying or has already given birth to an unwanted child. Id.
" See, e.g., Doe v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 170, 307 N.W.2d 438, 441 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983); In re Adoption of Baby Girl L.J., Anony-
mous, 132 Misc. 2d 972, 978, 505 N.Y.S.2d 813, 816 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1986);
Keane, supra note 15, at 147. See generally Comment, supra note 28, at 611 (proposal for
legalization of surrogate parenting arrangements); Comment, New Reproductive Technologies:
The Legal Problem and a Solution, 49 TENN. L. REV. 303 (1982) (analysis of scientific and legal
aspects of alternative reproductive techniques).
48 See, e.g., Surrogate Parenting Assocs. v. Kentucky, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986) (associa-
tion's charter to assist in the matching of infertile couples with potential surrogate mothers
upheld as not involving black marketing); Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 420 Mich. 367, 362
N.W.2d 211 (1985) (lower court has subject matter jurisdiction over biological father's re-
quest for order of filiation under the Paternity Act where he and child's biological mother
entered into surrogate parenting arrangement); Doe v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 307
N.W.2d 438 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (state's interest in preventing black marketing of in-
fants is strong enough to justify disallowance of compensation to surrogate mother). But see
In re Baby "M", 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987) (best
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lative guidance.4' As a result, these cases have been decided on
narrow grounds, making it difficult to derive any meaningful
precedent.50
The family law doctrines which are most relevant to the surro-
gate arrangement involve statutes pertaining to artificial insemina-
tion and adoption. It is submitted, however, that an analysis of
these statutes will demonstrate that such laws were not enacted as




Early decisions involving artificial insemination8 ' held that artifi-
interests of child favored enforcement of surrogate parenting arrangement placing child in
her father's sole custody); Adoption of Baby Girl, 132 Misc. 2d 972, 505 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sur.
Ct. Nassau County 1986) (court gave legal effect to contractual arrangement under which
surrogate mother was to receive $10,000 where best interests of the child required ap-
proval of adoption petition of child's biological father and father's spouse). See generally
Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy and Childbirth, 69 VA.
L. REv. 405 (1983) (evaluation of the meaning and scope of procreative rights in an era of
rapidly changing family structure); Note, Surrogate Motherhood: The Outer Limits of Protected
Conduct, 1981 Dzr. C.L. REV. 1131 (1981) (discussion and analysis of Doe v. Kelley deci-
sion); Note, In Defense of Surrogate Parenting: A Critical Analysis of the Recent Kentucky Experi-
ence, 69 Ky. L.J. 877 (1980-8 1) (response to Attorney General's opinion declaring contracts
void).
" See Surrogate Parenting Assocs. v. Kentucky, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky.. 1986). The court
stated that if the surrogate parenting procedure is to be outlawed, it is for the legislature to
decide. Id. at 214. See also Adoption of Baby Girl, 132 Misc. 2d 972, 505 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sur.
Ct. Nassau County 1986). The court found that the New York legislature did not contem-
plate surrogate parenting arrangements when it enacted a statute prohibiting payments in
connection with an adoption. Id. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 374(6) (McKinney 1983). As
current legislation does not prohibit surrogate parenting arrangements, the court indicated
that it is for the legislature to determine if such payments should be disallowed so as to
prevent such practices in the future. Adoption of Baby Girl, at 978, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 818. See
generally Wadlington, Artificial Conception: The Challenge for Family Law, 69 VA. L. REV. 465
(1983) (legal and medical communities must communicate in order to spark legislative ac-
tion); Note, supra note 37, at 143; Comment, Artificial Insemination and Surrogate Mother-
hood: A Nursery Full of Unresolved Questions, 17 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 913 (1981) (recommen-
dation that couples considering this method proceed with caution because of the possible
invalidity of the contract).
"o See supra note 48. See also infra notes 51-83 and accompanying text.
"1 See R. SNOWDEN & G. MITCHELL, THE ARTIFICIAL FAMILY 16 (1981). Artificial insemina-
tion has been defined as the introduction of semen into the reproductive tract of a female
by means of a syringe. Id.
There are three types of artificial insemination currently utilized: artificial insemination
by husband (AIH), artificial insemination by donor (AID), and confused artificial insemina-
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cial insemination by donor (AID), even with the consent of the
surrogate's husband was an act of adultery, and that children born
as a result of this technique were illegitimate.52 The New York
judiciary, after vascillating on the issue of illegitimacy for a num-
ber of years,5" finally took a definitive stance in the decision of In
re Adoption of Anonymous." In this case, New York held contrary
to the 1963 decision of Gursky v. Gursky,"I and decided that "a
child born of consensual artificial insemination by a donor during
a valid marriage is a legitimate child entitled to the rights and
privileges of a naturally conceived child of the same marriage.""
tion (AIC). See Shaman, Legal Aspects of Artificial Insemination, 18 J. FAM. L. 331 (1978-79).
AIH involves inseminating the woman with semen extracted from her husband. Id. at 331-
32. Couples unable to conceive by normal intercourse because of physical difficulties or
male infertility may use this method. Id.
The second type, AID, occurs when the woman is inseminated with semen extracted
from a donor other than her husband. Id. at 332-33. This method may be used when the
husband is sterile or carries genetic defects which result in hereditary diseases. See W. FINE-
GOLD, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 20 (1964); Shaman, supra at 332.
The third method, AIC, involves combining the semen of the husband and a third party
donor and then introducing this combination into the woman's genital tract. Shaman,
supra at 332. This is done for physiological or psychological reasons. Id. Using this method
the husband is assured a chance that he is the biological father. Id.
" See, e.g., Doornbos v. Doornbos, 12 Il1. App. 2d 473, 139 N.E.2d 844 (Ill. App. Ct.
1956); Orford v. Orford, 49 Ont. L.R. 15, 58 D.L.R. 251 (1921).
" See Strnad v. Strnad, 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1948).
The New York courts originally determined that a child conceived through AID was legiti-
mate, and that the consenting father had a right to visitation after the parents divorced. Id.
The court in this case viewed the husband's consent to AID as a "potential adoption" and
indicated that the children were like children born out of wedlock who are made legitimate
upon the subsequent marriage of the father and mother. Id. at 787, 78 N.Y.S.2d at 391-92.
See Comment, supra note 47, at 303.
In 1963, a New York trial court took a step backward and held that an AID child was
illegitimate. Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1963). The court ignored the common law presumption of legitimacy of any child born
during marriage, and indicated that any child whose genetic father was not married to its
mother was illegitimate regardless of the mother's marital status. Id. at 1086, 242 N.Y.S.2d
at 409. However, the court held that the husband was liable for child support based on
contract law principles because he had signed a written consent to the AID procedure. Id.
at 1088, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 411.
74 Misc. 2d 99, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1973).
39 Misc. 2d at 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 406. See supra note 53.
" 74 Misc. 2d at 105, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 435-36. In this case, a husband contested the
adoption of his AID child by his former wife's second husband. Id. The court held that the
first husband's consent was necessary for the adoption. Id. See also Comment, supra note
49, at 923. This case paved the way for New York Domestic Relations Law § 73 which
addresses artificial insemination. See N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977). For the
text of this statute, see infra note 63. See also Gallin & Newman, Whose Child is This?, 8 HuM.
Rrs. 14, 49 (1979).
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In contrast, the California court in People v. Sorenson5 7 avoided
an express finding of legitimacy and held that the husband of a
woman who conceived a child through AID was the legal father
because such a child conceived by artificial insemination has no
"natural father."5 8
These cases illustrate the lack of clear guidelines regarding the
status of legal relationships resulting from the use of artificial in-
semination. Consequently, legislatures were prompted to enact
statutes which attempted to remedy this problem."
2. Legislative Enactments
Currently, at least twenty-seven states have enacted legislation
aimed at regulating artificial insemination." Many of these stat-
utes, including section 73 of the New York Domestic Relations
Law, 61 are modeled after the Uniform Parentage Act,62 which is a
" 68 Cal. 2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968).
Id. at 282, 437 P.2d at 498, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 10. Sorenson involved a criminal prosecu-
tion for failure to support a child: Id. The husband in this case consented to AID and
treated the child as his own until the couple's divorce. Id. Mr. Sorenson later claimed that
he was not the father and refused to pay child support. Id. The court held that he had a
duty to support the child, and indicated that the term "father" in the penal statute at issue
referred to the legal father rather than the biologically related sperm donor. Id. at 284,
437 P.2d at 498, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
" See infra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
" ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (Michie Supp. 1984); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1983); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 61-141(c) (1971); CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005 (West 1983); COL REV. STAT. § 19-6-
106 (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f-69n (West 1981); FL. STAT. ANN. § 742.11
(West Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. §§ (74-101), 43-34-42 (1984); IDAHO CODE § 39-5405-01
(Michie Supp. 1984); ILL ANN. STAT. ch.40 §1452 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §23-128 (1981); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1985); MD. EST. & TRUSTS
CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (Michie Supp. 1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.2824, 700.111
(West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1983);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.061 (Michie 1986); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (Michie 1976) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 551 (West 1987); OR REV.
STAT. §§ 109.239, .243, .247, 677.355, .360, .365, .370 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-
306 (1983); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03 (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (1980);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.050 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 767.47(9),891.40 (West
1981 & Supp. 1987); Wvo. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1977).
" N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977). For the text of this statute, see infra note
63.
"' UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 5, 9A ULA. 579, 592-93 (1979). This section provides:
(a) If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of her
husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by a man not her
husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the natural father of a child
thereby conceived. The husband's consent must be in writing and signed by him and
his wife. The physician shall certify their signatures and the date of the insemina-
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codification of the common law presumption that a child is legiti-
mate if born within a marriage or within a reasonable time
thereafter."3
If artificial insemination statutes such as section 73 of the Do-
mestic Relations Law are applied to surrogate parenting arrange-
ments in which the surrogate mother is married, such agreements
would be effectively precluded, unless the biological father could
overcome the statutory presumption that a child born to a mar-
ried surrogate mother is the legitimate child of her husband."' In
eleven states, it would be even more difficult for the biological fa-
ther to establish his paternity since these states have enacted stat-
utes which specifically provide that the sperm donor is not the le-
gal father of a child born to a woman who is not his wife. 6
tion, and file the husband's consent with the [State Department of Health], where it
shall be kept confidential and in a sealed file. However, the physician's failure to do
so does not affect the father and child relationship. All papers and records pertain-
ing to the insemination whether part of the permanent record of a court or of a file
held by the supervising physician or elsewhere, are subject to inspection only upon
an order of the court for good cause shown.
(b) The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial insemi-
nation of a married woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law as if he
were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived.
Id.
" See H. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 15-17 (1971). See also State ex.
rel. H. v. P., 90 App. Div. 2d 434, 457 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1st Dep't 1982) (presumption of
legitimacy of children born during wedlock is one of the strongest and most persuasive
known to the law, though it is rebuttable). The New York artificial insemination statute
provides:
1. Any child born to a married woman by means of artificial insemination per-
formed by persons duly authorized to practice medicine and with the consent in
writing of the woman and her husband, shall be deemed the legitimate, natural child
of the husband and his wife for all purposes.
2. The aforesaid written consent shall be executed and acknowledged by both the
husband and wife and the physician who performs the technique shall certify that he
had rendered the service.
N.Y. DOM. RL LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977).
While section 73 provides that a married woman's husband must consent to the proce-
dure in writing, a few states have legislation which presumes that the husband consents to
the procedure. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-141(c) (1971); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §
700.111(2) (West 1980).
" See, e.g., In re Baby Girl, 9 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2348 (Ky. Cir. Ct. 1983) (motion by
husband of surrogate mother to terminate his parental rights and transfer custody and
legal paternity to biological father denied because child born in wedlock is conclusively
presumed to be legitimate child of husband and wife).
"See Andrews, The Stork Market: The Law of the New Reproductive Technologies, 70 A.B.A. J.
50, 53 (1984). The following states have created such a presumption: Alabama, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, Texas, Washington, Wiscon-
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It is submitted, however, that the artificial insemination statutes
were not enacted with surrogate parenting arrangements in mind.
In fact, the Uniform Parentage Act, which served as a model for
the current artificial insemination statutes, was never intended to
deal with the complex and serious legal problems raised by the
technique of artificial insemination." Thus, since the basis for
these insemination statutes themselves is quite tenuous, their ap-
plication to the surrogate arrangement is even less justifiable.
Consequently, these statutes should not be used as a basis for in-
validating such arrangments. To bridge this gap it is recom-
mended that legislators consider various other legal aspects.6" The
legislators have yet to heed this recommendation."
B. Adoption"
Surrogate parenting arrangements also conflict with the general
sin and Wyoming. Id. at 53. For the corresponding code sections, see supra note 60.
" UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 5, 9A U.L.A. 579, 592-93 (1979). The commissioner's com-
ment to section 5 provides:
This act does not deal with many complex and serious legal problems raised by the
practice of artificial insemination. It was though Isicl useful, however, to single out
and cover in this Act at least one fact situation that occurs frequently. Further con-
sideration of other legal aspects of artificial insemination has been urged on the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and is recommended to
state legislators.
UNIt. PARENTAGE AcT, supra note 62, § 5.
" See supra notes 60-63, 66 and accompanying text.
u See infra notes 84-124 and accompanying text for a discussion on proposed legislation
in New York.
"I N.Y. DoM. RE. LAW § 110 (McKinney 1977). Adoption has been defined as "the legal
proceeding whereby a person takes another person into the relation of child and thereby
acquires the rights and incurs the responsibilities of parent in respect of such other per-
son." Id. In New York, adoptions are permitted via authorized agencies as well a4 through
private placements. See id. at §§ 112-116 (McKinney 1977).
It is suggested that adoption laws may be employed to resolve problems stemming from
surrogate arrangements in certain situations. For example, in an uncontested proceeding in
which the surrogate mother voluntarily surrenders the child, the spouse of the biological
father might seek to adopt the child. The natural father is not required to adopt his biolog-
ically related offspring since he can establish his rights as the natural parent under other
statutes. See, e.g., N.Y. Family Court Act § 511-757 (McKinney 1983). See also Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). Alternatively,
adoption laws might come into play in situations where the surrogate contract is invali-
dated, or where the surrogate reneges on the contract and the validity of the contract is
undecided. In these situations, the proceeding would become a custody dispute with the
judge awarding custody based on the best interests of the child. See N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW §§
114 and 116(2) (McKinney 1977). These statutes authorize the judge or surrogate to make
an order approving an adoption if he is satisfied that the best interests of the adoptive child
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prohibition against providing compensation in connection with
the placing of a child for adoption. While many state statutes
contain such restrictions, payment of medical and legal fees is gen-
erally deemed proper.7 However, it is uncertain whether the pay-
ment of a fee to the surrogate mother is in violation thereof, and
an examination of a number of cases which address this issue is
illustrative.
As previously discussed, the court in Doe v. Kelley held that the
Michigan adoption statute did not directly prohibit a couple from
having a child as planned. Instead, it merely interfered with the
arrangement whereby the couple promised to pay a third party a
sum of money to bear a child which was fathered by the husband
via artificial insemination.3 Implicit in the court's decision, how-
ever, was the underlying suggestion that the contractual arrange-
ment itself was valid, even though the payment of consideration in
connection with the adoption was not. 4
are promoted thereby. Id. In an adoption, where the natural mother revokes her consent,
the court must be satisfied that the adoptive parents can provide a better home than the
surrogate mother. Id. Such a standard would leave couples who enter into surrogate ar-
rangements uncertain as to whether they would ever have custody of the child, even
though they have complied with the terms of the agreement.
Recently, however, in the celebrated Baby "M" case, Judge Sorkow found that the adop-
tion laws of New Jersey did not apply to surrogacy agreements. 217 N.J. Super. at 390, 525
A.2d at 1156. The court indicated that its power to award custody of the child derived
from the exercise of its parens patriae jurisdiction. Id. Parens patriae has been defined as the
power of the sovereign to watch over the interests of those who are incapable of protecting
themselves. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979). It was this jurisdiction, and not
the laws of adoption, custody, and parental termination, which allowed the court to deter-
mine that the best interests of the child favored enforcement of the surrogate agreement,
and enabled the court to place the child in her father's sole custody. 217 N.J. Super. at
390, 525 A.2d at 1157-58.
70 See, e.g., N.Y. Soc SERV. LAW § 374(6) (McKinney 1983), which provides in part:
[n]o person may or shall request, accept or receive any compensation or thing of
value, directly or indirectly, in connection with the placing out or adoption of a child
• . . and no person may or shall pay or give to any person. . . any compensation or
thing of value in connection with the placement or adoption of a child ....
Id. See also N.Y. Soc. S.Rv. LAW § 389(2) (McKinney 1983), which provides that a violation
of section 374(6) is deemed to be a misdemeanor. Id. A second violation is considered a
felony. Id.
7 See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 273 (West Supp. 1976); CoLAo. REV. STAT. § 19-4-115 (1986);
MICH. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 710.54 (Supp. 1987); N.Y. Soc SERV. LAW § 374(6) (McKinney
1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-37 (1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 866(1) (1983).
" 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981). See supra notes 23-26
and accompanying text for discussion of Kelley.




In a recent New York case, In re Adoption of Baby Girl L.J., Anon-
ymous,' the court held that a contractual arrangement whereby a
surrogate mother was to receive a payment of $10,000 for bear-
ing a child, was a voidable contract, but not void. 6 The court
opined that the best interests of the child required approval of the
adoption petition of the child's biological father and the father's
spouse." The court further explained that while it is a misde-
meanor in New York to violate the adoption statutes78 which pro-
hibit accepting compensation in connection with placing a child
for adoption,'7 it is within the discretion of the legislature to de-
termine if such payments should be disallowed in the context of
surrogate parenting arrangements.80
132 Misc. 2d 972, 505 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1986).
I d. at 978, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 818.
I d. at 974, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
" Id. See N.Y. Soc SEav. LAW § 389(2) (McKinney 1982); see also supra note 70 for text of
statute.
" 132 Misc. 2d at 974, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 815. See N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 374(6) (McKinney
1983). See supra note 70 for text of statute.
" 132 Misc. 2d at 978, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 818. Another issue which legislators must ad-
dress is the question of visitation rights. See, e.g., In re Baby "M", 217 N.J. Super. at 403,
525 A.2d at 1173 (court addressed issue of grandparents' visitation rights). Absent agree-
ment to the contrary, it is almost certain to arise after custody of the child has been
awarded to one of its biological parents in the surrogate parenting arrangement. Id. This
difficult decision would depend upon whether granting visitation rights to the noncustodial
parent would be in the best interests of the child. See C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160,
377 A.2d 821 (1977).
In the 1978 English decision, A. v. C., the Court of Appeal refused to grant the biologi-
cal father visitation rights in a surrogate parenting arrangement, reasoning that the natural
mother should be free from "interference from an obsessive father." [1985] F.L.R. 445
(Fam. & C.A. 1978). In this unusual case, the natural father and his live-in girlfriend, a
divorced mother who could no longer bear any children, solicited a prostitute to bear the
man's child. Id. at 451-53. She declined, however, and a young girl of nineteen was found
to bear the child. Id. When she refused to hand over the child the father brought suit for a
determination of visitation rights. Id. The trial court held the contract unenforceable as
against public policy. Id. Nevertheless, it granted visitation rights to the father reasoning
that it was to the child's advantage to have contact with both parents. Id. In reversing the
trial court's reluctant grant of visitation rights, the court of appeals indicated that the ar-
rangement was a "totally inhuman proceeding" and "a sordid commercial bargain." Id. at
455-57.
Two of the three justices indicated that they originally had decided not to publish the
decision because they considered it of little precedential value. Letter from Professor Cyril
C. Means to his colleagues Uanuary 27, 1987) (discussing his letter on surrogacy in England
to the New York Times). When they changed their minds in 1985, the case was published
not in the official reports, but in the unofficial Family Law Reports, which is not readily
available in many American law libraries. Id. See also N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1987, at A 22,
col. 5 (letter from Cyril Means to the editor).
In the United States, a California court decided a case involving a young woman who
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It is submitted that statutes prohibiting compensation in con-
nection with the placing of a child for adoption should not be ap-
plied to surrogate arrangements. The purpose of such legislation
is to prevent unscrupulous persons from preying on financially in-
secure pregnant women, and coercing them into giving up their
unwanted children in exchange for money.81 This is not the pro-
file of the typical surrogate arrangement where the payment in-
volved is for the services of the surrogate in carrying the child,
and not for the "purchase" of the child.82 As these arrangements
do not involve any of the evils contemplated by legislatures in
their enactment of provisions prohibiting such compensation,83
they should not then, be used as tools to invalidate surrogate
agreements.
III. PROPOSED LEGISLATION IN NEW YORK
A. Senate Bill
A bill introduced by Senators Dunne and Goodhue" places sur-
rogacy agreements within the realm of traditional contract law.
Essentially, it provides that subject to court approval, 85 the surro-
gate contract is enforceable and shall not be deemed a violation of
agreed to be a surrogate mother for her second cousin and her husband. See Peterson,
Surrogates, Finding No Laws, Often Improvise Birth Pacts, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1987, at AI,
col. 5. She then inseminated herself with the husband's sperm using a syringe. Id. The
surrogate later sued for joint custody of the child. Id. In a very unusual decision, the court
allowed her to see the child several days a week, awarding her child support as well. Id. In
this case, the young woman and the couple had written their own brief surrogate contract
in which the woman agreed to give up all rights to the child in exchange for $1500. Id.
8 See Comment, supra note 29, at 478. Underlying such legislation is the recognition
that because profit is the main motive for baby selling, there is little or no concern for the
child and thus its welfare is in danger. Id. See generally Note, Black-Market Adoptions, 22
CATm. LAw. 48, 50-51 (1976).
" See Comment, supra note 29, at 478-79; Note, supra note 37, at 156. Surrogate
parenting attorney Noel Keane notes that pregnancy and childbirth are hazardous, painful
conditions which few women can be expected to experience for another unless they are
duly compensated. See Keane, supra note 15, at 153.
" See supra note 81, and accompanying text. (discussion of purposes of such legislation).
" N.Y.S. 1429, 209th Sess. (1986).
Id. at § 2:120(l). A petition for judicial review shall be brought in the county where
the surrogate mother resides. Id. at § 2:120(3). It shall be verified by the intended parents.
Id. at § 2:123(1). A hearing shall be held within thirty days of the filing at which the
surrogate mother and intended parents shall be examined to determine whether they are
making voluntary and informed decisions. Id. at §§ 2:124(l)(a-b).
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public policy." Furthermore, section 73 of the Domestic Relations
Law6 7 is amended in this context to provide that any child born to
a surrogate mother shall be deemed the legitimate, natural child
of the intended parents."6
The Senate version also contains a number of provisions worthy
of note. First, it permits the payment of fees to the surrogate in
exchange for services rendered.8 ' The only limitation is that these
fees be stated in an affidavit filed with the court in order that a
determination can be made as to whether they are "just, reasona-
ble and consistent." 0 Second, before the parties may proceed
with the actual surrogate procedure, the agreement must be re-
viewed and approved by a court of competent jurisdiction." The
filing of this petition is to be followed by a hearing at which both
the surrogate mother and the intended parents are to be ex-
amined." Only after requisite court approval shall the agreement
I ld. at §§ 1, 2:126.
See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
N.YS. 1429 § 3:73(3), 209th Sess. (1986). The intended parents are considered to be
the sperm donor father and his wife. Id. at § 2:119(2).
" Id. at § 2:123(1). This section provides that a statement must be filed attesting to "any
and all fees paid or to be paid by or on behalf of the intended parents in connection with
the surrogate parenting agreement." Id. See also id. at § 2:124(l)(e)(1)-(5).
" Id. at § 2:124(2)(b).
" Id. at § 2:120(1).
" Id. at § 2:124(l). The court's examination of the parties under oath is to determine
the following:
(a) That the party being examined has freely and knowingly entered into the
agreement;
(b) That the party being examined is fully informed as to all aspects of the agree-
ment and the proceeding, and of that party's rights and obligations under the agree-
ment and in the proceeding;
(c) That the intended parents understand that as of the date of the child's birth they
will have full parental responsibilities, including the duty of support of such child:
(d) That the surrogate mother understands that upon the birth of the child, she will
have no parental rights in and to such child; and
(e) The compensation paid to the surrogate mother shall be based on the surrogate
mother's:
(1) calculation of anticipated lost wages;
(2) actual or anticipated expenses incurred:
(3) value of time expended:
(4) the value of health risks incurred or likely to be incurred to or on account of
the surrogate parenting agreement; and
(f) Any other information the court in its discretion deems necessary to ascertain the
validity of the surrogate parenting agreement.
Id.
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have full force and effect.93
Third, the Senate bill provides that upon judicial approval, the
surrogate's consent to relinquish her parental rights is irrevoca-
ble.9 However, should any compelling, changed circumstances
arise, the surrogate would be able to petition for custody of the
child. 5 Finally, the proposal makes an exception to traditional
contract law regarding personal service contracts by affording the
intended parents the remedy of specific performance in the case
of a breach by the surrogate.96
B. Assembly Bill
Assembly bill #3774 was introduced in 1983 by Assemblymen
Halpin, Hevesi and Catapano.97 Unlike its Senate counterpart,
this bill operates within the realm of adoption law.98 However, it
too recognizes the validity of surrogate arrangements and deems
any child born to the surrogate to be the legitimate child of the
biological father and his spouse."
Perhaps because it is rooted in adoption law principles, the As-
sembly bill contains a number of provisions in sharp contrast to
the Senate bill.100 First, no fees or monetary compensation are
permitted, with the exception of necessary medical and maternity
costs, attorney's fees, and the loss of real income.' 01 Second, while
the Senate bill provides for the irrevocable consent of the surro-
gate, ' the Assembly bill provides for an unconditional twenty-
day "cooling off" period during which the surrogate is entitled, if
she so chooses, to initiate a custody proceeding.1 0 3 Finally, the
I d. at § 2:126.
Id. at § 2:124(l)(d).
• See also id. at § 2:127 (change in circumstances application for review).
Id. at § 2:122(1)(b). Note that the remedy of specific performance is only available
after the surrogate mother has been inseminated. Id. In the instance where the insemina-
tion has not yet taken place, the legislature has not deemed either party's interests compel-
ling enough, at this point, to warrant the remedy of specific performance. Id.
97 N.Y.A. 3774, 206th Sess. (1983).
" Id. at § 1.
Id. at § 1:65-c.
Io d. See infra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
101 N.Y.A. 3774, 206th Sess. § 165-a(3) (1983). See also supra notes 15 and 27 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of compensation to the surrogate mother.
'02 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
N.Y.A. 3774, 206th Sess. § 1:65-e(3) (1983).
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terms of the Assembly bill make it a requirement that the surro-
gate be represented by independent legal counsel.'" In addition,
such counsel is to be of the surrogate's own choosing and any le-
gal fees incurred are considered part of the necessary and legiti-
mate expenses which are reimbursable to her by the contracting
parties.1 05
C. Analysis
Both of the proposals illustrate an awareness of the need for
legislation in the area of surrogate motherhood; yet, it is sug-
gested that neither bill of its own accord adequately addresses the
problem.?0 Nonetheless, there are certain meritorious aspects of
each proposal that, working in concert, can provide a satisfactory
resolution of the controversy surrounding the surrogate
procedure.10
By allowing for the payment of compensation to the surrogate,
the Senate bill leaves both the statute itself and surrogate agree-
ments, which it regulates, open to abuse. It is a major concern of
many that the payment of fees could lead to the undesirable con-
cept of "wombs for rent" with the added tendency that the proce-
dure be rendered a viable alternative only for the rich. 10 8 More-
over, existing case law suggests that such a practice would be
unacceptable.1 0' As previously discussed, the court in Kelley"t0
found that absent compensation, the surrogate contract would be
enforceable."' Similarly, the English court in A. v. C.11' strongly
104 Id. at § 1:65-k(2). This section provides that the same attorney cannot represent both
the natural father and the surrogate. Id. Not only is the surrogate entitled to independent
counsel, but such counsel may be provided at a cost to the natural father. Id. See also supra
note 99 and accompanying text.
100 N.Y.A. 3774, 206th Sess. § 1:65-k(2) (1983).
104 See infra notes 107-127 and accompanying text.
107 Id.
'0' See Letter from Assemblyman Patrick G. Halpin to Mel Miller, at 3 (Feb. 9, 1987)
(discussing the dangers of allowing monetary compensation to surrogate mothers). But see
SENATE COMMrrrE REPORT supra note 3, at 54 (allowing payment of compensation to sur-
rogate mothers will prevent exploitation).
100 See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Kelley case. See
also supra note 80 for a discussion of A. v. C.
110 See Doe v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d at 438 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
Id. at 169, 307 N.W.2d at 438. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
[1985] F.L.R. 445, 458.
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disapproved of the payment of fees, describing it as a "sordid
commercial bargain""11  and a "lamentable commercial
transaction. "11
In comparison, the Assembly bill strictly prohibits the payment
of fees.'1 5 It is suggested that this is the only way to assure a non-
pecuniary motive of surrogate candidates.1 It is further sug-
gested that this will not decrease the pool of willing surrogates
because the statute does provide that the surrogate be compen-
sated for her lost income during the period of her pregnancy. 1 7
Another favorable aspect of the Assembly bill is its provision for
a twenty-day "cooling off" period in which the surrogate may de-
cide to petition for custody of the child.116 However, this provi-
sion interjects an element of risk for the intended parents, as it
affords the surrogate mother the unconditional right to revoke
her consent and petition for custody.119 Hence, this seems to es-
tablish a noticeable inequity. In contrast, the Senate bill requires
that the surrogate mother demonstrate a compelling change in
circumstances in order to petition for custody of the child.2 °
Therefore, should additional information concerning the in-
tended parents come to light or certain circumstances arise that
would indicate their unfitness as parents, the surrogate would
have recourse by which she could protect the child if she felt it
necessary to do so. Thus, this approach is more favorable.
The Senate bill also contains a specific performance provision
which would force the surrogate to deliver over the baby to the
intended parents. 21 While this provision may appear sound in
113 Id. at 457.
"' Id. at 460.
l See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
, See Parker, Motivation of Surrogate Mothers: Initial Findings, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 117
(1983). In a recent survey on the motivations of women applying to become surrogate
mothers, 85% of the women surveyed indicated that they would not participate without
compensation. Id. at 118. But see Markoutsas, Parenting by Proxy - A Story of Love and Friend-
ship, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 14, 1980, § 2, at 1 (surrogate mother who was friend of wife
bore two babies for her gratuitously).
17 N.Y.A. 3774, 206th Sess. § 1:65-a(3) (1983).
"I ld. at § 1:65-e(3).
" Id. Even though they comply with all of the terms of the contract, the couple runs
the risk of never obtaining custody of the child. Id.
180 N.Y.S 1429, 209th Sess. § 2:127 (1986).
121 Id.
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light of the prolific litigation in recent years over custody,"" it is
likely that such a provision would be viewed as a violation of the
thirteenth amendment2 3 which prohibits all types of forced servi-
tude.12 4 It is precisely for this reason that courts will not grant
specific performance as a remedy for breach of personal service
contracts. 12 5 It is suggested that the surrogate agreement must not
be deemed an exception.
Finally, the Senate bill contains numerous provisions for judicial
intervention and approval of surrogacy contracts. 126 Opponents of
this measure cite practical problems such as the inability of an al-
ready congested court system to handle this burden, as well the
increased costs this procedure will place on the contracting
couple. 127 It is submitted that while the reasoning behind requir-
ing judicial approval is sound, its practicality is suspect. It is sug-
gested, therefore, that a somewhat less stringent review be con-
ducted by an appointed official under the direction of the state's
family court system. In this way, surrogate contracts can still be
adequately monitored without overloading the court system.
CONCLUSION
It is apparent that advocates on both sides of the surrogate issue
pose legitimate concerns which must be addressed. The courts
have demonstrated their unwillingness to determine the law in
this area without legislative authority and guidance. The most re-
cent proposed legislation in New York and elsewhere is encourag-
ing; yet much remains to be determined concerning the bounda-
ries that apply to the surrogate procedure. It is submitted that
while the current proposals come very close to providing a solu-
tion to concerns involving the surrogate technique, legislators
must act quickly to prevent the legal uncertainty that currently
'2 See supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.
' U.S. CONsr. amend. XIII. See also Peonage Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (1982).
1 U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIII.
' See supra note 39.
' See supra note 85.
'" See Letter from Assemblyman Patrick G. Halpin to Mel Miller (Feb. 9, 1987) (discuss-
ing proposed surrogate parenting legislation).
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plagues both the children and families involved with this
procedure.
EPILOGUE
As this book was going to press, the New Jersey Supreme Court
case of In re Baby "M" was decided. That court held contrary to
the arguments set forth in this article with respect to the impact
of the adoption and in vitro fertilization laws on the validity of
surrogate motherhood.
The authors continue to believe that these laws are not applica-
ble to surrogate motherhood and that the issue should be decided
by the legislature and not the courts.
On another note, press reports indicate that the New York leg-
islature is considering redrafts and resubmission of the proposed
legislation. It is hoped that the new proposals will more ade-
quately address surrogate motherhood.
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